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Preventing and providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and
bonds are the primary focus of securities regulation laws. The two major
statutes to combat securities fraud in Texas are the Texas Securities Act
(TSA) and the Texas Stock Fraud Act (TSFA).1 Since the legislature
modeled the fraud provisions of the TSA on the federal statutes,2 Texas
courts use federal decisions under the federal statutes to interpret the
TSA’s similar language.3 This article therefore includes Fifth Circuit cases
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1969, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D. 1975, University of
Texas at Austin.
1. See TEX. REV. CIV. STATS. ANN. arts. 581-1 to 581–600 (West 2010 & Supp. 2017);
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (West 2015).
2. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (West 2010) (Comment to 1977
Amendment); Tex. S.B. 469, 65th Leg., R.S. (1977).
3. See, e.g., Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 741
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v.
Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 102 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see
also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 1129, 1133–36 n.3 (2013)
(discussing Highland Capital Management) [hereinafter Flint, Securities Regulation 2013];
George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1293, 1299–1302 (2007)
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addressing securities fraud issues under both state and federal law. This
article is not intended to exhaust all aspects of securities regulation but to
update the Texas-based securities practitioner on new Texas
developments that have emerged during the Survey period (December 1,
2016 to November 30, 2017).
I. COVERAGE OF THE TEXAS SECURITIES ACTS
The definitions—especially those relating to what constitutes a security
or a stock and the persons liable, as well as federal preclusion of state
securities fraud actions—determine the fraudulent transactions that are
subject to the state’s securities acts.4 One Texas court confronted a seller
of notes of an oil trader purchasing crude oil in Iraq. The seller desired to
sell the notes in Syria and Kurdistan through several misrepresentations
and omissions by claiming the notes were commercial loans and not se-
curities, and therefore not subject to the TSA.5 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit dealt with the territorial limitations of a
registration exemption under the TSA, also authorized as a registration
exemption under the Federal Securities Act6 for a seller of penny stock
on the secondary market throughout the nation.7 The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas handled the issue of whether converti-
ble notes are transactions in stock under the TSFA.8
A. DETERMINATION OF THE TYPE OF NOTES THAT ARE SECURITIES
UNDER THE TSA
The TSA clearly includes notes within the definition of “securities.”9
But the TSA also exempts notes of less than nine months from registra-
tion if sold by registered agents.10 In interpreting the corresponding lan-
(discussing Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International) [hereinafter Flint, Securities Regulation
2007].
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)–(3) (2012); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-
4(A)–(B) (West 2010).
5. See Khoury v. Tomlinson, 518 S.W.3d 568, 572–73 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2017, no pet.).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b).
7. See Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Kahlon, 873 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam).
8. See Ginsburg v. ICC Holdings, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-2311-D, 2017 WL 5467688, at
*19 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017).
9. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (West 2010) (“The term ‘security’ or
‘securities’ shall include any . . . note, bond, debenture, mortgage certificate or other evi-
dence of indebtedness . . .”).
10. See id. art. 581-6(H) (“Except as hereinafter in this Act expressly provided, the
provisions of this Act shall not apply to any of the following securities when offered for
sale, or sold, or dealt in by a registered dealer: . . . Any commercial paper that arises out of
a current transaction . . . and that evidences an obligation to pay cash within nine months
of the date of issuance . . . .”); id. art. 581-33(A)(2) (“A person who offers or sells a security
(whether or not the security or transaction is exempt under Section 5 or 6 of this Act) by
means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact . . . is
liable to the person buying . . . .”); id. art. 581-33(B) (same for buyer misrepresentations
and omissions).
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guage in the Securities Exchange Act,11 the U.S. Supreme Court has
determined that not all notes are included in the definition of “secur-
ity.”12 After considering but not rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s “investment
versus commercial” test13 and rejecting the “investment contract” ap-
proach used in other circuits,14 the Supreme Court adopted the “family
resemblance” test.15 Under this test, a note is presumed to be a security,
but this presumption may be rebutted by showing a strong resemblance
to notes held not to be securities. Such a showing may be made by exam-
ining four factors: (1) the motivations that prompted the buyer and seller
to enter into the transaction; (2) the distribution plan in order to deter-
mine whether the note is subject to common trading, offered to a broad
segment of the public, or intended to be sold on a secondary market; (3)
the reasonable expectation of the investing public as to whether the note
is an investment; and (4) the presence of risk-reducing mechanisms ren-
dering securities law protection unnecessary.16
In Khoury v. Tomlinson, the First Houston Court of Appeals con-
fronted a chief executive officer (CEO) who formed a company to trade
fuel oil and crude oil from Iraq into nearby markets.17 The CEO used the
company’s business plan to market the investment, which touted a con-
tract to sell fuel oil in Kurdistan in 2008 and in Syria in 2009. The contract
offered 14% interest on the investment along with a net share of 10% of
the profits distributed quarterly from the various contracts.18 The inves-
tor in this case invested $400,000 and signed a subscription agreement
acknowledging that the company had given him the opportunity to obtain
information necessary to evaluate the risks and merits of the investment,
that all questions about the investment had been answered, and that he
had carefully reviewed the risks associated with the investment. Mean-
while, the company, as part of the investment, signed a note.19 The inves-
tor subsequently became dissatisfied with the investment when the
company failed to provide financial information disclosures.20 The CEO
personally agreed to repay the amount loaned to the company over a four
to five-year period and confirmed the repayment agreement by email.
When the CEO failed to make the agreed payments, however, the inves-
tor sued for breach of repayment contract, common law fraud, and viola-
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, . . . bond,
[or] debenture, . . . but shall not include . . . any note . . . which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months . . . .”).
12. See Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64–65 (1990).
13. See id.; see also McClure v. First Nat’l Bank of Lubbock, Tex., 497 F.2d 490, 492–94
(5th Cir. 1974).
14. See Reeves, 494 U.S. at 63–64.
15. See id. at 66–67.
16. See id.
17. Khoury v. Tomlinson, 518 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017,
no pet.).
18. Id. at 572 (oil contracts), 582 (10% of profits).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 573.
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tion of the TSA.21 At trial, the CEO admitted that the contract to sell fuel
oil to Syria had been declined before the investor invested.22 The jury
found for the investor on all three claims, awarded $400,000 in damages
on each claim, and awarded attorney’s fees.23 After trial, the CEO’s at-
torneys moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was
granted with respect to the contract claim and the TSA claim but not the
fraud claim.24
The investor appealed and the court of appeals reversed and re-
manded.25 The main securities issue was whether the note constituted a
“security” as defined by the TSA. The investor’s brief laid out the above-
described “family resemblance” test, noted the Texas Supreme Court’s
instruction to apply federal interpretations of federal statutes to similar
language in the TSA,26 and applied the family resemblance test to show
that the note in this case was a security.27 The Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals and, recently, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas have applied this “family resemblance” test to the TSA definition
for a promissory note.28 But rather than follow this well-known securities
law test for notes, the Khoury court followed the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit’s old “investment versus commercial” approach ob-
tained from the CEO’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict.29 The Fifth Circuit adopted the “family resemblance” test twenty
years ago.30 Nevertheless, since 10% of the profits were paid quarterly,
the appellate court determined that this was not a commercial loan but an




24. Id. at 573–74.
25. Id. at 584–85. The breach of contract claim issues involved the statute of frauds
(the email confirmation was held to be a sufficient signature) and indefiniteness (definite-
ness was found where the parties agreed to allow the CEO four to five years for payment).
Id. at 579–80.
26. See Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637, 639–42 (Tex. 1977) (not-
ing that Texas courts follow federal court opinions in interpreting similar language in the
TSA, specifically when defining “investment contract” and “evidence of indebtedness”).
27. See Appellant’s Brief at 16–23, Khoury, 518 S.W.3d 568 (No. 01–16–00006–CV),
2016 WL 4076781, at *16–23.
28. See Grotjohn Precise Connexiones Int’l v. JEM Fin., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 859, 868–70
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.); Aubrey v. Barlin, 159 F. Supp. 3d 752, 754–57 (W.D.
Tex. 2016).
29. Compare Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at 581–82 (citing Bellah v. First Nat’l Bank of Here-
ford, Tex., 495 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1974)) and C.S. Ltd. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No.
814-89-00908-CV, 1990 WL 107888, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ de-
nied), with Defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict at 2, Khoury,
518 S.W.3d 568 (No. 2012-61491), 2015 WL 9392520, at *2 (citing same two cases before
advocating erroneous “investment contract” approach).
30. See Tr. Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1489 (5th Cir. 1997).
31. Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at 582. With respect to the three remaining securities-law is-
sues, the disingenuous arguments made by the CEO’s attorneys failed to bamboozle the
appellate court. Regarding materiality, the attorneys asserted that the cautionary language
in the subscription agreement triggered the “bespeaks caution doctrine” of federal securi-
ties law for “forecasts, opinions, or projections,” making materiality a question of law
rather than a jury question and therefore destroying materiality. See Brief of Cross-Appel-
2018] Securities Regulation 429
B. TERRITORIAL LIMITATION OF REGISTRATION EXEMPTIONS
UNDER THE TSA
Under Rule 504 of the Federal Securities Act, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) has provided for an exemption from registra-
tion for limited offerings and sales of securities not exceeding $5
million.32 The rule provides for three situations in which the exemption
may arise: (1) where all sales are made in states that require registration
and delivery of a disclosure document to the investors; (2) where sales are
made in at least one state requiring registration and delivery of a disclo-
sure document to that state’s investors and in other states not requiring
registration, provided that the registering state’s disclosure document is
also delivered to those other state’s investors; and (3) where sales are
made in states not requiring registration but which exempt from registra-
tion solicitation and general advertising for sales made only to accredited
investors.33 Under this rule, Texas qualifies as an exemption state by pro-
viding an exemption for sales to financial institutions and certain institu-
tional investors (excluding individuals).34
The seller in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Kahlon sought to
lee at 4, Khoury, 518 S.W.3d 568 (No. 01-16-00006-CV), 2016 WL 5720922, at *4 (question
of law); id. at *13 (destroys capacity of a misleading statement to influence a reasonable
investor); see also Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719,
744–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Flint, Securities Regulation 2013,
supra note 3, at 1129, 1133–36 (discussing Highland Capital Management). Unfortunately
for the CEO’s attorneys, the court of appeals found that the material misstatement con-
cerned a contract for Syrian oil appearing numerous times in the prospectus and not in
projections as is required for the bespeaks caution doctrine, and applied Texas cases stating
that, under the TSA, investors have no duty to verify sellers’ claims. Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at
582–83; see also In re Westcap Enters., 230 F.3d 717, 726 (5th Cir. 2000); Summers v.
WellTech, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
With respect to the three-years-from-discovery statute of limitations, these attorneys
claimed that the TSA three-year period was an element of the cause of action. See Brief of
Cross-Appellee, supra, at *15–16 (not a statute of limitations but an element); see also
Shields v. State, 27 S.W.3d 267, 275 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (finding limitations
inapplicable for an action by the state under the TSA). The court of appeals refused to
treat the three-year period as an element of the cause of action and instead followed those
cases treating it as a statute of limitations. Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at 584; see also Arnold v.
Life Partners, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 577, 589 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013), aff’d, 464 S.W.3d 660
(Tex. 2015); Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 367 S.W.3d 355, 401–03 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.); George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regula-
tion, 1 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 101, 102–06 (2014) (discussing Life Partners) [hereinafter
Flint, Securities Regulation 2014]; Flint, Securities Regulation 2013, supra note 3, at 1129,
1143–49 (discussing Allen).
With respect to the damages issue, the attorneys claimed that the investor suffered no
damages because the note was payable to the investor’s lender and that the calculation of
damages should have been used for disposition of the security. The appellate court found
that there was some evidence that the investor suffered damages because he paid the in-
vestment amount and requested that the interest payments be sent to his lender, and be-
cause there was no evidence that the investor disposed of the security before trial. Khoury,
518 S.W.3d at 584.
32. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2017).
33. See id. at § 230.504(b)(1)(i) (registering states), (ii) (one registering state), (iii) (all
exemption states for accredited investors).
34. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.4 (2017) (State Sec. Bd., Securities Registration
Exemption for Sales to Financial Institutions and Certain Institutional Investors).
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utilize the federal and Texas registration exemptions for penny stocks35
by incorporating as a New York limited liability company, purchasing 100
acres in Texas, registering as a foreign limited liability company in Texas,
hiring a registered agent in Texas, and obtaining a Texas mailing address,
yet conducting all business transactions from New York.36 The seller
would “purchase large blocks of shares of [penny stock companies] at a
discount,” representing that the purchases were for the seller’s own ac-
count and were not to be distributed to other purchasers.37 Thus, the
seller acquired stock certificates with no restrictive legend requiring regis-
tration of the securities or an exemption from restriction before being
resold, yet within a few days the seller began to resell the unregistered
shares on the open market for a profit.38 The seller was advised that its
business plan was legal, but failed to inform the opining attorney that the
plan included a public distribution of the penny stock shares as soon as
possible after acquisition and that the seller’s operations were conducted
from New York.39 When the SEC notified the seller that it was consider-
ing charges against the seller, the seller ceased trading in penny stocks.40
The SEC brought charges in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas against the seller for selling unregistered securities and ob-
tained a summary judgment as to liability, a permanent injunction against
future registration violations, disgorgement of the seller’s profit, a civil
penalty, and a lifetime ban on trading penny stock.41
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.42 The seller’s
theory of the interplay between the two registration exemptions was that
a Texas company could purchase anywhere (only one penny stock com-
pany was from Texas) and rely on the Texas exemption for resale any-
where.43 The Fifth Circuit rejected this theory because Texas cannot
regulate securities transactions outside its borders;44 hence, the Texas ex-
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51–1(d) (2017) (defining penny stock as a security with a
price below $5.00).




39. Id. at 508.
40. Id. at 503.
41. Id. The SEC also pursued an underwriter claim against the seller under federal
law, which was not before the Fifth Circuit. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 505.
44. This is an overbroad proposition under Texas securities law. In the 1970s, Texas oil
and gas scams sold to nonresidents outside of Texas were injuring the Texas oil and gas
industry’s reputation. Thus, upon request of the State Securities Commissioner, the Texas
Attorney General sued these securities sellers and obtained injunctions. See Enntex Oil &
Gas Co. v. State, 560 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (hold-
ing regulation of sales outside of Texas of interests in Texas oil and gas leases to persons
not resident in Texas not a burden on interstate commerce); Rio Grande Oil Co. v. State,
539 S.W.2d 917, 921–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same).
Texas has since exempted these interstate sales from registration when sold by registered
dealers, but not from the TSA’s fraud provisions. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.7 (2017)
(State Sec. Bd., Sale of Securities to Nonresidents) (sales to nonresidents not present in
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emption does not apply to sales in other states.45 Instead, a seller must
either resell exclusively in Texas or comply with the exemption require-
ments of the other states in which the seller made resales.46
C. CONVERTIBLE NOTES ARE NOT A TRANSACTION IN STOCK
UNDER THE TSFA
To succeed under the TSFA, an investor must show: (1) a transaction
involving stock; (2) a false representation of fact or a false promise made
during the transaction; (3) the false representation or promise was made
to induce a party into the contract; (4) the party relied on the falsity; and
(5) the reliance led to injury.47 The scope issue faced by the Texas courts
related to whether convertible notes are “a transaction involving real es-
tate or stock in a corporation.”48
In Ginsburg v. ICC Holdings, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas dealt with an investment in an Illinois medical
marijuana business under a private placement memorandum containing
estimates of projected revenue and earnings. The memorandum stated
that the estimates were forward-looking statements not prepared in com-
pliance with published government guidelines.49 The investor purchased
$7 million of the company’s notes, which were convertible into Class B
Texas by Texas-registered dealers exempt from registration; offer not deemed from Texas
merely because offering material was prepared in Texas, and sale not deemed made in
Texas if nonresident merely sends money to Texas).
45. Kahlon, 873 F.3d at 506. The SEC has won against a similar scheme by another
New York limited liability company using the Delaware registration exemption in conjunc-
tion with the federal registration exemption. See Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Bron-
son, 14 F. Supp. 3d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (business plan); id. at 415 (finding exemption
violated).
46. Kahlon, 873 F.3d at 505. The remaining securities-law issues related to the appro-
priateness of the penalty imposed by the district court. The Fifth Circuit noted that al-
though the offense (selling without registration) does not require scienter, the fact that the
seller misrepresented its presence in Texas and its intent to immediately resell constituted
recklessness and possibly intentional conduct, meriting a lifetime ban on trading in penny
stocks. Id. at 508. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the injunction against future registration
violations because the injunction was tailored to the offense committed. Id. Finally, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the disgorgement of profits based on gross revenues rather than net
profit because securities violators may not offset their disgorgement amount with business
expenses. Id. at 508–09. Justice Jones dissented with respect to the overly harsh penalties of
the penny stock trading ban and disgorgement because no investors were harmed by the
seller’s activities and the district court did not rule on the seller’s potential underwriter
status. Id. at 509 (no injury), 511 (underwriter theory). Justice Jones reasoned that the ban
was overbroad because the penny stocks could be traded other than in a transaction falling
within the registration exemptions at issue in the case, and there was no indication that the
offense would be replicated because the seller stopped when the offense was pointed out to
it by the SEC. Id. at 510–11. As to disgorgement, Justice Jones pointed out that gross
revenue rather than net profit is used where there is a showing of scienter. Id. at 511.
Justice Jones served on the Texas Law Review with the author in 1975.
47. See TEX. REV. CIV. STATS. ANN. arts. 581-1 to 581-600 (West 2010 & Supp. 2017);
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (West 2015).
48. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a).
49. Ginsburg v. ICC Holdings, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-2311-D, 2017 WL 5467688, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017).
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units of the company.50 After subsequently viewing three-year projec-
tions and hearing some puffing about a bright future, the investor pur-
chased $3.6 million more of the convertible notes. Thereafter, the
company provided the investor with five-year projections showing losses
and failed to pay interest on the notes, so the investor sued for statutory
fraud under the TSFA among other claims.51 The company moved to dis-
miss because there had been no actual conveyance of stock,52 and the
investor countered that contracts to convey stock qualify as transactions
involving stock in a corporation.53 The district court dismissed, noting
that the contract to convey stock must actually convey stock.54 The dis-
trict court found that convertible notes are similar to unvested options,
which Texas courts have determined do not constitute “transactions in
stock.”55
II. REGISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The TSA created the Texas State Securities Board (TSSB) to serve as
an enforcement agency and handle TSA-required registrations.56 Most
securities laws require that securities be registered with their correspond-
ing regulatory agency unless they are exempt.57 Similarly, securities sell-
ers must register before selling securities in the state, and investment
advisers must register before rendering investment advice in the state un-
less they are exempt.58 Enforcement actions generally focus on issuers
failing to register their securities (and simultaneously their selling agents)
and making misleading statements to aid their sales.
A. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INVESTIGATIVE DOCUMENTS
ACQUIRED BY THE TSSB
The TSSB obtained an informal letter ruling from the Texas Attorney
General addressing exemptions to the Public Information Act’s required
public disclosure so the TSA may keep certain TSSB investigatory docu-
50. Id.
51. Id. at *3. The investor also sued for breach of contract for default on the notes,
common law fraud, and violation of the federal securities laws, the TSA, the Illinois securi-
ties laws, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).
52. Id. at *18.
53. Id. at *19.
54. Id. at *20. The district court did not dismiss the contract claim since the company
failed to establish that the notes were unenforceable as against public policy. Id. at *9. The
district court also refused to dismiss the Illinois securities law complaint. Id. at *21. But the
district court did dismiss: (1) the common law fraud claim and the TSA claim since the
investor failed to plead material misrepresentation (just predictions and opinions); (2) the
federal securities law claims for failure to plead a strong inference of scienter; and (3) the
RICO claim. Id. at *13, *17–18, *22.
55. Id. at *20 (citing Ginn v. NCI Bldg. Sys., Inc., 472 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.); see also George Flint, Jr., 2 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 437,
449–51 (2016) (discussing Ginn) [hereinafter Flint, Securities Regulation 2016].
56. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-2 (West 2010).
57. See id. art. 581-7(A).
58. See id. art. 581-13(A).
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ments confidential.59 The Government Code exempts from the required
disclosures information made confidential by the constitution, a statute,
or a judicial decision.60 The TSSB acquired part of the subject informa-
tion in connection with an investigation to prevent or detect a violation of
the TSA, which is made confidential by statute.61 Another part of the
subject information was acquired by the TSSB during an inspection of a
registered dealer and a registered investment adviser to ensure compli-
ance with the TSA, which is also rendered confidential by statute.62 The
remaining information was not acquired through an investigation and so
was not exempted from the Public Information Act.63
B. EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS
The TSA does not apply to sales of securities by registered dealers of
certain outstanding securities if certain statutory conditions are met.64
The TSSB has a rule concerning this secondary trading exemption.65 One
condition is that securities of the same class must be registered or certain
information must be available in a recognized securities manual.66 The
TSSB recently amended its rule to update the manual exemption, requir-
ing that information relied on to claim the exemption must be current,
adding a reference to required information contained elsewhere in the
rule, noting that the financial information must be no more than eighteen
months old, adding as an acceptable manual the electronic information
available on otcmarkets.com, avoiding future amendments to the manual
exemption, and recognizing any manual of the Mergent manuals pub-
lisher, rather than the name of each one.67
59. Tex. Att’y Gen., No. OR2017-18823, 2017 WL 3740790, at *1; see TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 552 (West 2012 & Supp. 2017) (Public Information Act).
60. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.101 (West 2012).
61. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-28(A) (West 2010) (requiring information
connected to a TSSB investigation into potential TSA violations to be treated as confiden-
tial). Part of the information satisfied the elements of a previous determination, for which
the request was superfluous. Tex. Att’y Gen., No. OR2017-18823, 2017 WL 3740790, *2; see
also Tex. Att’y Gen., No. OR2004-0239, 2004 WL 121275 (previous determination letter
recognizing TSA art. 581-28(A) confidential exception to open records). Another part of
the information did not satisfy those elements, yet the attorney general exempted it as
fitting the confidentiality provided by the statute, but declined to give it a previous deter-
mination status. Tex. Att’y Gen., No. OR2017-18823, 2017 WL 3740790, *1–3.
62. Tex. Att’y Gen., No. OR2017-18823, 2017 WL 3740790, *2–3 (also refusing to give
previous determinations status); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13-1(A)
(West 2010) (authorizing inspection); id. art. 581-13-1(E) (rendering the information ob-
tained confidential).
63. Tex. Att’y Gen., No. OR2017-18823, 2017 WL 3740790, *2–3.
64. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(O) (West 2010).
65. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.7 (2017) (State Sec. Bd., Secondary Trading Ex-
emption Under the Texas Securities Act, § 5.O).
66. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581(O)(9) (West 2010).
67. See 41 Tex. Reg. 8159 (2016), adopted 2017 TX. REG. TEXT 439023 (NS) (with one
comment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.7 (2017)).
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C. MARKET OPERATORS
Commonly, state securities regulations will require a person to register
as a seller of securities before selling securities in the state and to register
as an investment adviser before rendering investment advice.68 Registra-
tion infractions usually come up when applying or reapplying for
registration.
The Texas Legislature increased the burden on dealers and investment
advisers in order to protect vulnerable adults from financial exploitation
by enlisting those dealers and investment advisers in ferreting out securi-
ties fraud on the elderly.69 For some time the TSSB has attempted to stop
investment scams that prey on the elderly.70 A “vulnerable adult” is
someone over age sixty-four or a person with disabilities, “exploitation”
means exercising undue influence over the person inconsistent with the
person’s past behavior, and “financial exploitation” is an unauthorized
taking of the person’s property or depriving the person of the use of their
property.71 A “securities professional” is an agent of a securities dealer or
investment adviser.72 A securities professional must report suspected fi-
nancial exploitation of vulnerable adults to the dealer or investment ad-
viser, who must assess the suspected financial exploitation and submit a
report to the Texas Securities Commissioner by the earlier of completion
of the investigation or the fifth business day, after which the dealer or
investment adviser may notify a third party associated with the vulnera-
ble adult unless that person is the financial exploiter.73 The dealer or in-
vestment adviser may place a hold on the vulnerable adult’s account for
up to ten business days, must place a hold when requested by the Texas
Securities Commissioner, and may extend the hold for an additional
thirty days when requested by the state or federal agency investigating
the suspected financial exploitation.74 Dealers and investment advisers
are to adopt internal policies and procedures for notification, assessment,
submission of reports, and placing holds.75 The securities professional is
immune from civil and criminal liability arising from the notification, re-
port, testimony, or participation in a judicial proceeding as long as the
securities professional acted in good faith. The same is true for the dealer
or investment adviser when deciding whether or not to place a hold, so
68. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13(A) (West 2010).
69. See Act of June 1, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 376, 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 376
(adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-45 (West 2017) as well as Chapter 280 to the
Texas Finance Code).
70. See Flint, Securities Regulation 2013, supra note 3, at 1129, 1141–42 (discussing the
TSSB’s concern with securities fraud on elders in 2010, leading to increased criminal penal-
ties under the TSA in 2013 for such fraud).
71. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-45(A)(2) (West Supp. 2017) (referring to
the newly amended Finance Code for definition of these terms).
72. See id. art. 581-45(A)(3).
73. See id. arts. 581-45(B) (report suspicions), 45(C) (report to Securities Commis-
sioner), 45(F) (notify associates).
74. See id. arts. 581-45(G) (the hold), 45(H) (initial ten-day hold), 45(I) (thirty-day
extension).
75. See id. arts. 581-45(E) (notifications), 45(J) (holds).
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long as the dealer or adviser also acted in good faith.76 The dealer or
investment adviser must also provide access to the records of a suspected
financial exploitation to the Securities Commissioner and other law en-
forcement agencies.77
D. ENFORCEMENT
The TSSB generally enforces its registration requirements through
emergency orders.78 Because con artists exploit current news and tech-
nology to confound unwary investors, the TSSB enumerates the following
top ten threats to investors: (1) unregistered individuals, because inves-
tors do not know about the information available from the registration
requirement; (2) cyberattacks using fake websites to convince investors
that they are dealing with a legitimate firm; (3) oil and gas deals, because
investors cannot investigate the claim; (4) cashing out to invest the funds
with an investment manager; (5) high yield notes, because investors can-
not evaluate credit worthiness; (6) foreign currency trading, because it is
volatile and can result in huge losses in a few hours; (7) cryptocurrencies,
because they are not backed by the government and their price is not set
by a centralized authority; (8) overseas investing due to the inability to
understand how the money will be made; (9) private placements, because
the investments lack transparency; and (10) real estate, because the hard
asset masks other risks.79 The TSSB’s actions focus on these threats.
The TSSB prosecuted several enforcement actions against dealers and
selling agents. One involved an advance fee scam in which the investment
promoters impersonated an advisory firm by approaching investors
through fake websites, social media, forged documents, and purported
affiliation with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).80 The promoters
offered to purchase the investors’ shares, provided the investors paid in
advance the costs of the sale to a company in the Philippines.81 Several
actions involved the failure of a registered agent to timely report various
76. See id. arts. 581-45(K) (securities professional), 45(L) (dealer or investment
adviser).
77. See id. art. 581-45(M).
78. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-23 (West 2010).
79. See TOP 10 INVESTOR THREATS (IN TIME FOR THE HOLIDAYS), TEX. ST. SEC. BD.
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/top-10-investor-threats-time-
holidays [https://perma.cc/J3WG-AT3B].
80. See In re Raymond Hill, Mark Diaz, & Wales Mktg. & Consultancy, No. ENF-17-
CDO-1751, 2017 WL 2039607, at *3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd., May 5, 2017).
81. See id. (emergency cease and desist order to stop engaging in fraud in offering to
buy; the fraud at issue involved using social media sites disguised as a registered Dallas
investment adviser, portraying themselves as associated with the registered investment ad-
viser, and claiming to be authorized to collect for the Internal Revenue Service; the costs
to collect were a de-restriction fee, a 2% brokerage fee, and sales taxes of the Internal
Revenue Service).
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embarrassing matters82 including (1) compromises with creditors83; (2)
judgment liens84; (3) imposition of tax liens85; and (4) arrest for a fel-
ony.86 One involved the failure to follow the dealer’s written policies con-
cerning client blank forms previously signed.87
The TSSB had several enforcement actions against investment advisers
and investment-adviser representatives. These involved (1) failing to en-
force a written system of supervising the investment advisers’ activities88;
(2) maintaining custody of client funds and securities without implement-
ing required safeguards89; (3) participating in block trades with clients
82. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.9(a)(6) (2017) (State Sec. Bd., Post-Registration
Reporting Requirements) (requiring dealers and their agents to report changes on previ-
ously filed forms within thirty days).
83. See In re Agent Registration and Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Brad
Cain, No. REG17-CAF-02, 2017 WL 1393152, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 5, 2017) (failed
to report settlement with three creditors seven years earlier within the thirty-day require-
ment; current registrations granted; reprimanded and fined $3,500).
84. See In re Agent Registration of Octavio Tovar, No. REG17-CAF-06, 2017 WL
5689554, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 21, 2017) (failed to report compromises with three
creditors for a year and two judgments for a year and a half; current registration granted;
reprimanded and fined $3,000).
85. See In re Agent Registration of Trevor M. Carney, No. REG17-CAF-05, 2017 WL
2748622 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 21, 2017) (failed to report two tax liens for over $100,000
for more than six years; registration granted; reprimanded and fined $7,500).
86. See In re Agent Registration of Michael Delao, No. REG16-CAF-04, 2016 WL
7217451, at *1–2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 6, 2016) (dealer’s policy required reporting arrests
for felonies, which agent failed to do, although charges were later dismissed; registration
granted; reprimanded and fined $7,500).
87. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration and Agent Registration of Marie P. Goforth,
No. REG17-SUS-04, 2017 WL 2039604, at *1–2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 4, 2017) (main-
tained signed client blank forms and reused signed client forms for two third-party checks
against dealer’s policy, for which she was terminated; current registration granted, sus-
pended for forty-five days, and required to comply with an agreement calling for unan-
nounced review of her files: for a one-year period, all client submissions were subject to
review by a supervisor, and for a five-year period, all complaints were to be submitted to
the TSSB).
88. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Provident Capital Mgmt. Inc., No. IC-17-
CAF-02, 2017 WL 2748628, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 19, 2017) (failed to supervise
investment advisers in accordance with written policy, failed to establish written policy to
prevent misuse of nonpublic information, failed to update form reporting changes to TSSB
and clients, and failed to include required language on client form; suspended for sixty
days; required to make and maintain necessary policies, provide clients with updated infor-
mation, and retain an independent compliance consultant who reported to the TSSB; fined
$8,000); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 116.11(4) (2017) (State Sec. Bd., Disclosure Re-
quirement/Brochure Rule) (requiring disclosure of certain part of form information annu-
ally to clients), 116.12(a) (Advisory Contract Requirements) (specifying language in client
disclosure), 116.9(a)(6) (Post-Registration Reporting Requirements) (2017) (requiring
dealers and their agents to report changes on previously filed forms within thirty days).
89. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Michael Keith Parish, No. IC17-CAF-03,
2017 WL 3226045, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 18, 2017) (maintained custody of client funds
and securities without implementing required safeguards and failed to maintain current
balance sheet, income statements, general ledger, and auxiliary ledgers; suspended for
thirty days to provide required records and fined $5,000); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 116.5(a) (2017) (State Sec. Bd., Minimum Records) (requiring investment advisers to
maintain certain records), 116.17(b) (Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Regis-
tered Investment Advisers) (requiring safekeeping of client funds and securities).
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contrary to the investment adviser’s policy90; (4) failing to abide by an
undertaking concerning registration of an investment adviser subject to a
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Order (FINRA)91; and (5) fail-
ing to timely report tax liens and civil judgments filed against the agent.92
E. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The TSA provides criminal penalties for various acts in connection
with securities transactions.93 The recent criminal cases reaching the ap-
pellate courts involved several of the top ten threats to investors—
namely, unregistered securities, high-risk notes in connection with real
estate, and high-yield life settlements—and some involved scams to raise
money for the criminal’s personal expenses. These appellate courts also
faced imaginative criminal lawyers who attacked the constitutionality of
the TSA’s criminal provision and the requisite criminal mental state.
In Villarreal v. State, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals considered a
criminal case involving the sale of an unregistered membership in a lim-
ited liability company engaged in the insurance business.94 The con artist
(the seller of the membership) needed money for the mortgages on his
mansion, various real estate properties, and his yacht.95 The con artist
saw an opportunity to pay these amounts by enticing a businessman (the
purchaser) to purchase a membership in the con artist’s to-be-formed
90. See In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Kermit Gordon Gable Jr.,
No. REG 17-SUS-03, 2017 WL 1393158, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 10, 2017) (investment
adviser representative failed to follow investment adviser’s policy requiring block trades
under which aggregate orders of multiple clients are handled as one transaction; also in-
cluded investment adviser representative’s orders to specify how investment adviser repre-
sentative would allocate shares among himself and clients; registration granted; suspended
for 150 days).
91. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of 212 Advisory Grp., LLC, No. IC17-CAF-04,
2017 WL 4940237, at *1–3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 23, 2017) (undertaking (1) forbade using
investment adviser representative in a supervisory position, which was violated by allowing
representative to be the only agent at an office; (2) required bi-annual compliance reviews
by an outside monitor, which was not done; and (3) required establishment and mainte-
nance of procedures for heightened supervision of investment adviser representative.
FINRA offense involved (1) failure to disclose outside business ventures—namely, the pri-
vate, undisclosed purchase of promissory notes; (2) fined $15,000; and (3) investment ad-
viser representative was suspended for ninety days); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.10
(2017) (State Sec. Bd., Supervisory Requirements) (requiring investment advisers to have
supervision policies over their investment adviser representatives).
92. See In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Robert Yrshus, No. REG 17-
CAF-01, 2017 WL 663924, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 13, 2017) (failed to report tax liens
and civil judgment while registered as a dealer’s agent before 2013; application granted;
suspended for sixty days and fined $5,000); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.9(a)(6)
(2017) (State Sec. Bd., Post-Registration Reporting Requirements) (requiring dealers and
their agents to report changes on previously filed forms within thirty days).
93. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29 (West 2010).
94. Villarreal v. State, 504 S.W.3d 494, 501 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016), cert.
denied, Villarreal v. Texas, 138 S. Ct. 398 (2017) (mem.); see also Alberto Alba Villarreal,
Daniel Thomas Hernandez: Indicted, TEX. ST. SEC. BD. (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.ssb.tex
as.gov/news-publications/alberto-alba-villarreal-0 [https://perma.cc/8SZH-GJ33] (selling
securities without registration).
95. See State’s Appellate Brief at *12–13, Villareal, 504 S.W.3d 494 (No. 13-15-00037-
CR), 2016 WL 1118197, at *12–13.
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limited liability company rather than that of the con artist’s brother.96
Realizing that the businessman would only invest if the con artist also
invested, the con artist obtained a $2 million bank loan and deposited the
amount in a certificate of deposit.97
The con artist then represented to the businessman that his brother’s
proposal did not have sufficient funds, that Texas required $4 million to
start an insurance company, and that he had sufficient funds by exhibiting
the certificate of deposit. The con artist also showed the businessman his
struggling insurance businesses in Mexico, representing that they were
doing well.98 The con artist formed the limited liability company, with the
con artist and businessman each to contribute $2 million. The con artist
was to manage the company under the company agreement, and the busi-
nessman would eventually own 48% of the company.99 The businessman
deposited $1 million into a company account for which both the con artist
and the businessman were signatories.100
The con artist then moved the money to another bank for which only
he was the signatory.101 The businessman’s money was spent in three
months on the loan payments for the con artist’s certificate of deposit and
various real estate loans.102 Before investing further amounts, the busi-
nessman requested an accounting and received only a list of expenses
exceeding $1 million.103 Neither the con artist nor the businessman in-
vested further, and the businessman filed a complaint with the TSSB after
failing to obtain the return of his money.104 The con artist was indicted
for securities fraud and theft by deception, found guilty, and sentenced to
ten years for securities fraud and five years for theft by deception.105
The court of appeals reversed the criminal securities fraud convic-
tion,106 addressing issues involving the constitutionality of the TSA’s pe-
nal provision and the application of its five-year statute of limitations for
criminal indictments.107 The enterprising attorneys for the con artist
96. See id. at *7 (purchaser’s negotiations with brother),*14 (seller’s opportunity to
pay off debts).
97. See id. at *8.
98. See id. at *14–16.
99. Villarreal, 504 S.W.3d at 501.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See State’s Appellate Brief, supra note 95, at *20–21.
103. Villarreal, 504 S.W.3d at 501–02.
104. Id. at 502.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 512. The case also involved a theft conviction, which the appellate court
affirmed.Id. at 512–16. The petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was
based on the spillover effect from the statements made about the securities fraud case
influencing the theft conviction in violation of due process under the 14th Amendment. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Villareal v. Texas, 2017 WL 3948484, at *5–6 (2017) (No. 12-
347), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 398 (2017); see also U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
107. Villarreal, 504 S.W.3d at 507–12; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29-1
(West 2010) (“An indictment for an offense under Subsection C of Section 29 may be
brought only before the fifth anniversary of the day on which the offense is committed.”).
Another securities law issue was whether the TSSB’s prosecution violated the constitu-
tional separation of power between the executive and legislative branches. Villareal, 504
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urged that the TSA’s criminal provision for securities fraud was unconsti-
tutional because it assigns criminal penalties for ordinary negligence.108
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determines whether securities
fraud is material by using a “reasonable investor” standard applicable to
civil proceedings, which requires a lower burden of proof.109 These enter-
prising attorneys asserted that this standard violated the Fifth Amend-
ment’s requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth
Amendment’s requirement of a jury verdict in accordance with the Fifth
Amendment, both applicable to the State of Texas by the Fourteenth
Amendment.110 The attorneys argued for the application of a recent U.S.
Supreme Court case overruling a criminal conviction where the Congres-
sional criminal statute was silent on the mental state required for convic-
tion.111 The court of appeals observed that, as an intermediate appellate
court, it was required to follow the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’
decision; however, it also noted that the TSA criminal provision did re-
quire a specific mental state—intentional failure to disclose a material
fact—which would satisfy the requirement.112 Having concluded that the
TSA criminal provision was constitutional, the court of appeals then con-
sidered the TSA’s five-year statute of limitations and concluded that the
TSA’s definition of “sale” was broad and included “any transfer or agree-
ment to transfer.”113 Therefore, the offer occurred when the parties
signed the company agreement five years and three days before the crimi-
nal indictment.114
In Nelson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals dealt with a real estate
scheme marketing high interest notes.115 The fraudster sold several series
S.W. 3d at 501. The appellate court found no violation because the district attorney merely
used two TSSB attorneys as assistants without relinquishing control over them.Id. at
502–07.
108. Villareal, 504 S.W.3d at 501; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29(C)(1)
(West 2010) (“Any person who shall . . . in connection with the sale [of] any security . . .
engage in any fraud or fraudulent practice . . . is guilty of a felony of the first degree, if the
amount involved is $100,000 or more.”); see also id. art. 581-4(F) (“The terms ‘fraud’ or
‘fraudulent practice’ shall include . . . any misrepresentations, in any manner, of a relevant
fact . . . or an intentional failure to disclose a material fact . . . .”).
109. Villarreal, 504 S.W.3d at 508. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the
definition of “materiality” for the TSA’s criminal provision from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of “materiality” for civil fraud. See Birdwell v. State, 804 S.W.2d 900, 903–04
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976)).
110. See Brief for Appellant at 14–21, Villareal, 504 S.W.3d 494 (No. 13-15-00037-CR),
2015 WL 5559621, at *14–21 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993)); see
also U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV.
111. Villarreal, 504 S.W.3d at 509; see also Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012
(2015) (overturning conviction for issuing a threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) because fed-
eral criminal law must examine defendant’s mental state, not just the perceived result).
112. Villarreal, 504 S.W.3d at 509–10.
113. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(E) (West 2010) (“The term ‘sale’ means and
includes contracts and agreements whereby securities are sold . . . or any transfer or agree-
ment to transfer in trust or otherwise”).
114. Villarreal, 504 S.W.3d at 512.
115. Nelson v. State, No. 05-16-00494-CR, 2017 WL 2334237, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Dal-
las May 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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of notes, bringing in an excess of $37 million; one series promised returns
of 10% per month for three months, and another supposedly paid a re-
turn of 18% annually for five years.116 The fraudster told investors that
he would use the proceeds from the sale of the promissory notes to buy
distressed properties, renovate them, and then lease or sell them, thereby
generating the money to pay the notes.117 Instead, the fraudster used at
least $20 million of the investor funds to pay off earlier investors and $2.7
million for personal expenses and contributions to his church.118 The mis-
representations and omissions essentially consisted of failing to disclose:
(1) that the funds for payment on the notes came from subsequent inves-
tors; (2) that funds were used for personal purposes; and (3) that the in-
vestment program was not generating sufficient profits to pay interest on
the notes.119 A jury convicted the fraudster of securities fraud and as-
sessed a penalty of nineteen years in prison and a fine of $10,000.120
The court of appeals affirmed.121 The securities issue for the court of
appeals concerned the sufficiency of the evidence to show the requisite
mental state for the misrepresentations.122 With respect to the misrepre-
sentation concerning the use of the funds for personal uses, the fraud-
ster’s inventive attorneys claimed that the jury could not “rationally infer
an intent to defraud when so much money was given to churches” and
charities.123 The court of appeals rejected this assertion, finding no au-
thority for the proposition that the use of fraudulently gained money for
charitable purposes defeats the intent to defraud.124 With respect to the
misrepresentations about the Ponzi nature of the program and the belief
that the program was profitable, the fraudster’s inventive attorneys as-
serted that the jury could not rationally infer an intent to defraud due to
the fraudster’s lack of an educational background—he left high school as
a senior, earned a general education diploma, and attended a few college
classes.125 Again, the court of appeals rejected this claim because there
was no authority for the proposition that the absence of diplomas and
degrees negates an intent to defraud.126
116. Id. at *2 (series of notes), *3 (total $37 million).
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id. at *1–2.
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *6–8. The appellate court also examined two other issues: sufficiency of the
jury charge and the prosecutor-witness as an expert witness. The fraudster’s attorneys chal-
lenged the jury charge for failing to separate fraudulent and non-fraudulent acts in calcu-
lating the $100,000 amount; but the charge and statements made clear that the transactions
used to calculate the $100,000 had to consist of securities fraud. Id. at *8–11. The fraud-
ster’s attorneys raised a structural challenge to the expert witness because he was a TSSB
prosecutor, but the appellate court rejected the assertion because no authority indicated
that such an error was structural. Id. at *11–12.
123. Id. at *7.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *5 (educational background), *8 (jury could not infer).
126. Id. at *8.
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In Ex parte McDermott, the Dallas Court of Appeals confronted a ped-
dler of life settlements under an investment program instituted by his em-
ployer, a financial intermediary.127 A life settlement is a transaction
under which an owner of a life insurance policy sells the policy at a dis-
count (reflecting a future rate of return and premium costs over the
owner’s expected life) in order to obtain money to spend.128 The financial
intermediary locates the policy sellers, negotiates the discount, locates in-
vestors to provide the purchase price of fractional interests in the life
insurance policies, takes title to the policies as an agent of the investors,
and maintains a trust fund to pay the premiums.129
The financial intermediary’s program provided “16.5% interest per
year for the insured’s life expectancy” to the investors.130 If the insured
died early, the investors also received the saved premiums, but if the in-
sured outlived the life expectancy used to discount the sales price of the
policy by more than two years, the investors had to pay the additional
premiums or forfeit their investment.131 These financial intermediaries
are notorious for underestimating the life expectancies used in calculating
the discounts, which is information they conceal from the investors prior
to their purchases.132 This financial intermediary knew about the very
poor reputation of the company it used for estimating life expectancies,
including its practice of falsifying life expectancies in order to sell poli-
cies, diverting millions of dollars to its officers and a subsidiary used to
reimburse investors in a Ponzi scheme, and comingling funds for future
premiums with other operational expenses.133 In the TSSB’s securities
fraud action against the peddler, the peddler’s creative attorneys chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the TSA in a “habeas corpus [action] to
prohibit prosecution on vagueness grounds” and “to prohibit retroactive
127. Ex parte McDermott, No. 05-16-01357-CR, 2017 WL 1953286, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas May 11, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Resale Life
Insurance Policy Program); see also R. Gray, W. Rogers, R. James, & D. James,
MeDermott: Indicted, TEX. ST. SEC. BD. (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-
publications/r-gray-w-rogers-r-james-d-james-mcdermott-indicted [https://perma.cc/GG5P-
4E8F] (a $77 million securities investment program of Retirement Value LLC acquired life
insurance policies from third parties and sold interests in the proceeds from the policies to
investors).
128. See Magaraci v. Espinosa, No. 03-14-00515-CV, 2016 WL 858989, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Austin Mar. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining the workings of the Retire-




132. See Nathan Vardi, Early Death, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2009), www.forbes.com/2009/09/
17/life-insurance-settlements-a-and-o-business-insurance.html [permalink unavailable]
(discussing the life settlement practices of A&O Life Fund and its bankruptcy causing tens
of millions of dollars in losses); see also Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Odds Skew
Against Investors in Bets on Strangers’ Lives, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2010), http://wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748704694004576019344291967866 [https://perma.cc/5ERS-
WHHH] (for life settlement investments made from 2002 to 2005, 83% of the insureds
lived past their life expectancies as calculated by Life Partners, Inc.).
133. See Magaraci, 2016 WL 858989 at *1 n.3 (explaining the TSSB’s action against the
financial intermediary for securities fraud, its partial judgment, and its order to repay $77
million to its investors).
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application of a judicial decision.”134 The district court concluded that the
claims were “not cognizable by a pretrial habeas” corpus action.135
The court of appeals affirmed.136 For a habeas corpus action, the court
may only consider how the statute is written, not how it is applied in a
particular situation.137 The alleged vagueness claim and retroactive claim
were based on the discrepancy between a 2004 court of appeals decision
and a 2015 Texas Supreme Court decision.138 The 2004 case found that
life settlements did not fall within the definition of “security” under the
TSA, but the 2015 case found the contrary five years after the peddler
had made his sales, which created uncertainty about whether the new def-
inition retroactively proscribed his conduct in violation of his due process
right to fair notice.139 The court of appeals noted that the supreme court’s
pronouncement was based on decades of decisions from throughout the
nation, including Texas.140 But the court of appeals rested its affirmation
on the supreme court’s indication that the life settlements in its case were
securities, meaning that other life settlements might not be securities,
which would require a record, and so the habeas corpus action was
inappropriate.141
III. SECURITIES FRAUD
One major reason legislatures passed securities acts was to facilitate
investors’ actions to recover their money through a simplified fraud ac-
tion that removed scienter and privity, the most difficult elements to
prove in a common law fraud action. These securities act changes gener-
ally apply only to the primary market. When investors purchase in the
secondary market, their actions reintroduce these obstacles.
A. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE TEXAS ACTS
Under the TSA, attorneys for investors have had difficulty with the
statute of limitations and materiality, probably caused by the inability to
discern significant misrepresentations and omissions. One case involved
purchases of interests in a start-up company in the process of being
134. Ex Parte McDermott, No. 05-16-01357-CR, 2017 WL 1953286, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas May 11, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). One of the




137. Id. at *2.
138. Id. at *1–2.
139. Id. at *1–2; see also Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold, 464 S.W.3d 660, 684 (Tex. 2015);
Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 10-01000271-CV, 2004 WL 1178418, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Waco May 26, 2004, no pet.); see also Flint, Securities Regulation 2016, supra note 55, at
439–45 (discussing Arnold), 445 n.57 (discussing the same conclusion on the other states);
George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1136–37 (2005) (dis-
cussing Griffitts) [hereinafter Flint, Securities Regulation 2005].
140. McDermott, 2017 WL 1953286, at *3.
141. Id.
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formed, so the structure may not have initially been clearly formulated.142
Another case dealt with the sale of interests in an insolvent company that
was sold a year and a half later for a significant amount, so the investors
rued missing out on significant gains.143
In Mad-Mag Development, LLC v. Cargle, investors bought interests in
a limited liability company being formed to operate a retirement facil-
ity.144 The investors alleged that a number of misrepresentations and
omissions were contained in the private placement memorandum they
had received in April 2008 prior to signing the company agreement at the
end of that month.145 These misrepresentations and omissions related to
the shifting structure of the start-up—the investors were not sure whether
the entity was a limited partnership, limited liability company, or some-
thing else.146 The misrepresentations and omissions in the private place-
ment memorandum consisted of: (1) offering interests in an entity labeled
a “company” that did not yet exist, but came clear when signing the com-
pany agreement; (2) referring to an “attached” company agreement that
was not actually attached, which the investors’ attorneys claimed should
have been read with the private placement memorandum (the investors
later did receive the company agreement to sign within the month); and
(3) a vague explanation that the officers would own a larger percentage
of the company than the other members without explaining how to calcu-
late that percentage. The investors’ attorneys asserted that the investors
would have hesitated to invest if the information had been included in the
private placement memorandum, yet the percentage was attached as an
exhibit to the company agreement that the investors received and
signed.147 The investors filed suit in December 2011, alleging two causes
of action under the TSA for selling unregistered securities and selling
securities by means of misrepresentations and omissions.148 The trial
court granted the investors’ motion for summary judgment.149
The Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.150 The statute
142. See Mad-Mag Dev., LLC, v. Cargle, No. 07-16-00132-CV, 2017 WL 2791217, at *1
(Tex. App.—Amarillo June 26, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
143. See Gonzalez v. UniversalPegasus Int’l, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
144. Mad-Mag Dev., 2017 WL 2791217, at *1; see also Appellee’s Brief at *5, Mad-Mag
Dev., 2017 WL 2791217 (No. 07-16-00132-CV), 2016 WL 4620684, at *5 (purchased limited-
liability company interests).
145. Mad-Mag Dev., 2017 WL 2791217, at *1.
146. See Appellee’s Brief, supra note 144, at *5 (early approaches by the promoters
indicated that the entity was a limited partnership while the private placement memoran-
dum described it as a company).
147. Mad-Mag Dev., 2017 WL 2791217, at *1.
148. Id. at *2–3; see also Plaintiff’s Original Petition at *8–9, Mad-Mag Dev., 2017 WL
2791217 (No. 100159), 2011 WL 13064079 (item 34 for violation of TSA’s registration re-
quirement). The TSA actions were brought under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-
33(A)(1),(2) (West 2010). The investors also sued for violation of the federal securities
laws. Plaintiff’s Original Petition at *3, Mad-Mag Dev., 2017 WL 2791217 (No. 100159),
2011 WL 13064079; see also Appellee’s Brief, supra note 146, at *7 (item 28 for violation of
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2017)).
149. Mad-Mag Dev., 2017 WL 2791217, at *1.
150. Id. at *4.
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of limitations for a TSA action involving the sale of unregistered securi-
ties is three years; for a sale by means of misrepresentation or omission,
the statute of limitations is three years from the time of discovery but no
more than five years after the violation.151 The party asserting an affirma-
tive defense, such as the statute of limitations, need only show a fact issue
to defeat a motion for summary judgment.152 The record and evidence
indicated that the company agreement had been signed by the investors
at the end of April 2008 and the investors had not brought the lawsuit
until three years and seven months later, creating a fact issue as to
whether the investors had acted within the statute of limitations.153 Thus,
the appellate court did not need to examine the other securities law issues
such as the materiality of the misrepresentations and omissions.154
In Gonzalez v. UniversalPegasus International, Inc., the former com-
mon stock investors in a Delaware company cashed out in a merger,
thereby missing a 150-fold increase when the survivor of the merger was
sold twenty months later. The investors sued the directors and the surviv-
ing company under the TSA for various misrepresentations and omis-
sions in the merger disclosures.155 In connection with the merger, under
which the common stock investors had the choice of receiving one cent
per share of stock or seeking a court appraisal of the stock’s fair value,
the investors received an information statement and notice of ap-
praisal.156 The common stock investors claimed the following as misrep-
resentations in the information statement: (1) that the investors’ shares
had been cancelled by the merger when shares for appraisal were not
cancelled; (2) that the company’s equity was of no value when a subse-
quent appraisal showed otherwise; and (3) that the conversion price of
one cent required signing a liability release of the directors and waiver of
the appraisal.157 The investors also asserted omissions of: (1) the most
recent financial statements; (2) the method of determining value; (3) a
151. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(H)(1)(a) (three years with a possible
extension for a rescission offer), 33(H)(2) (West 2010) (within three years of discovery).
The federal securities law cause of action similarly has a within two years of discovery but
no more than five years after the violation limitations period. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b)
(West 2017).
152. Mad-Mag Dev., 2017 WL 2791217, at *2.
153. Id. at *3. The federal securities cause of action has the same fact issue with respect
to its statute of limitations, defeating a summary judgment for the federal action. Id.
154. See Defendant’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment at *5, Mad-Mag
Dev., 2017 WL 2791217 (No. 100159), 2016 WL 1329153 (paragraph 9 discusses whether
there was a misrepresentation or omission, its materiality, and the investors’ reliance).
155. Gonzalez v. UniversalPegasus Int’l, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 276, 287 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Appellant’s Brief at *13–14, *33, Gonzalez, 531
S.W.3d 276 (No. 14-16-00009-CV), 2016 WL 1532534, at *13–14, *33 (appraised value de-
termined by extrapolating back from acquisition price; received $9,000 in the merger for
shares appraised at $1,356,000 by the extrapolation back). The common stock investors
also sued for failure to comply with the original certificate of formation requiring notice of
a fundamental change and breach of fiduciary duty. Gonzalez, 531 S.W.3d at 279 (terms of
the certificate of formation), 280 (the three claims).
156. Gonzalez, 531 S.W.3d at 279.
157. Id. at 286–87.
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fairness opinion; and (4) the directors’ potential conflicts.158 The trial
court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the company
and directors.159
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.160 With respect to
the conversion misrepresentation, the court of appeals found that the in-
formation statement required the shares to be transmitted by a letter of
transmittal, which was attached to the information statement and con-
tained the release information.161 With respect to the no-equity misrepre-
sentation, the court of appeals found within the information statement
that the valuation report (provided by a valuation firm the company
hired) concluded that the company had no intrinsic value because the
company owed $150 million more than it was worth and had defaulted on
$200 million in debt.162 With respect to the non-cancellation misrepresen-
tation, the court of appeals found in the information statement that all
shares were cancelled and converted into the right to receive one cent or
an appraisal.163 With respect to the omissions of the most recent financial
statements and a fairness opinion, the court of appeals found the infor-
mation within the information statement adequate in the absence of an
investor explanation that the most recent financial statements and a fair-
ness opinion would have changed significantly the information contained
in the information statement.164 With respect to the methodology omis-
sion, the court of appeals found that the information statement contained
enough information on the company’s financial condition to lead a rea-
sonable person to the conclusion that the company’s shares were value-
less.165 Finally, with respect to the potential conflicts omission, the court
of appeals determined that Delaware law finds no conflict when all share-
holders are treated equally and receive the same compensation for their
shares.166
B. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
The TSA’s fraud provisions are modeled on the federal statutes, so
Texas courts look to federal decisions under these statutes to interpret
TSA provisions with similar language.167 As a result, Texas courts often
analyze Fifth Circuit opinions involving securities law fraud. Fraud ac-
tions under the federal statutes generally possess six elements: (1) a mate-
rial misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with a
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6)
158. Id.
159. Id. at 278. The appellate court also found no breach of the certificate of formation
and no breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 284, 288–89.
160. Id. at 278.
161. Id. at 285.
162. Id.




167. See sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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“loss causation”—that is, a causal connection between the material mis-
representation and the loss.168 The last element comes from the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).169 The PSLRA also requires
the investor’s petition to recite facts giving rise to a strong inference of
scienter.170 In the Fifth Circuit, scienter requires an intent to defraud,
severe recklessness with knowledge of the danger to investors, or action
despite danger so obvious that the officer must have been aware of the
danger.171 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the group-pleading
doctrine, so the scienter must be of a specific issuer officer; thus, scienter
may not be implied from prospectuses, registration statements, or press
releases.172
Attorneys for shareholders in securities class actions find it difficult to
plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. In Neiman v.
Bulmahn, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dealt with an oil
and gas company that had collapsed into bankruptcy.173 Those who pur-
chased the company’s common stock in the public market during the one-
and-a-half-year period before the bankruptcy filing brought a class action
against the company’s officers.174 Most of the company’s drilling was in
the Gulf of Mexico and was subject to government drilling moratoria due
to an oil spill. Nonetheless, the company continued to spend on infra-
structure construction, which included the construction of a pipeline ex-
tending from deepwater wells in the Gulf of Mexico.175 The shareholders
alleged misstatements made by several officers, including the chief finan-
cial officer, concerning the production from one well of 104 Gulf of Mex-
ico wells, the company’s liquidity and funds to complete the pipeline, and
168. See Dura Pharms. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (discussing Commis-
sion Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012).
170. See id. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (“[T]he complaint shall . . . state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”).
171. See Southland Secs. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir.
2004); see also Flint, Securities Regulation 2005, supra note 139, at 1135, 1155–56 (discuss-
ing Southland).
172. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 366.
173. Neiman v. Bulmahn, 854 F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 2017). The case was originally filed
in the Southern District of Texas and removed to the Eastern District of Louisiana. See
Neiman v. Bulmahn et al., JURAL INDEX, https://www.juralindex.com/civil/neiman-v-bul
mahn-et-al [permalink unavailable] (filed in Tex. Aug. 5, 2013); Neiman v. Bulmahn et al.,
PACER MONITOR, https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/1740880/Neiman_v_Bulmahn
[https://perma.cc/TJM5-RZWU] (removed to La. Oct. 4, 2013). The oil and gas company
filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas on August 27, 2012. See In re ATP
Oil & Gas Corp., No. 12-36187, 2013 WL 3866495, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 19, 2013)
(mem. op.). The bankruptcy trustee sued the officers and directors of the oil company for
reckless spending pending the bankruptcy, but the bankruptcy trustee fared no better than
the investors. See Tow v. Bulmahn, No. 15-3141, 2016 WL 1722246, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Apr.
29, 2016), aff’d sub nom. In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp., 711 Fed. App’x 216, 225 (5th Cir.
2017) (per curiam) (no breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent transfers, civil conspiracy, or
legal malpractice against the corporate counsel); see also id. at *31 (granting summary
judgment for the officers).
174. See Firefighters Pension & Relief Fund of N.O. v. Bulmahn, 147 F. Supp. 3d 493,
497–98 (E.D. La. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Neiman, 854 F.3d at 744.
175. See id. at 498–99.
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the true reason the newly appointed chief executive officer resigned.176
The trial court dismissed the complaint because the petition did not plead
facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.177
The Fifth Circuit affirmed.178 The petition was unsuccessful primarily
due to its failure to plead a motive for the alleged misstatements and
omissions.179 With respect to the one-well-production misstatement, the
Fifth Circuit provided three reasons that the pleadings failed to give rise
to a strong inference of scienter.180 First, the subsequent disclosure ne-
gated an inference of scienter where there were no fact allegations sug-
gesting a reason to lie about the production in September, only to later
disclose the correct amount in November.181 Second, access to internal
reports containing the correct information did not raise a strong inference
of scienter in the absence of fact allegations that the reports were actually
read by the misstating officer.182 And third, the misstating officer’s posi-
tion within the company did not give rise to a strong inference of scienter
because the company’s large size prevented it from using the Fifth Circuit
inference of scienter for special circumstances involving small
companies.183
With respect to the company’s liquidity and funds to complete the pipe-
line, the Fifth Circuit provided five reasons that the pleadings failed to
give rise to a strong inference of scienter.184 First, the continuous disclo-
sure of the deteriorating cash position undercut any inference of scien-
ter.185 Second, reasonable persons could disagree on the meaning of
statements that the company’s financial condition depended on future
production that might not be met and the explanation that the company
would seek alternative means of financing that might not be readily avail-
able.186 Third, the three-month timespan between the statements on the
adequacy of liquidity and the filing of bankruptcy did not establish scien-
ter because the officers had disclosed their liquidity concerns at the be-
ginning of the period.187 Similarly, the two-month timespan between
176. Neiman, 854 F.3d at 744–46.
177. Id. at 744, 746. The bankruptcy trustee’s lawsuit fared no better. The Fifth Circuit
rejected the trustee’s claims against the officers of the company for breach of fiduciary
duty in paying preferred stock dividends at the time of the company’s impending bank-
ruptcy and for breach of fiduciary duty and the fraudulent conveyance statute for the pay-
ment of cash bonuses to certain officers in the two-year period before bankruptcy for
pleading deficiencies as well. See In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp., 711 Fed. App’x 216, 221–22
(5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
178. Neiman, 854 F.3d at 744.
179. Id. at 747 (the production misstatement), 752 (the pipeline misstatement, the resig-
nation misstatement). In fact, the officers had lost approximately $100 million as a result of
the company’s bankruptcy. See Firefighters, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 520.
180. Neiman, 854 F.3d at 747–50.
181. Id. at 747–48.
182. Id. at 748–49.
183. Id. at 749–50.
184. Id. at 750–52.
185. Id. at 750.
186. Id. at 751.
187. Id.
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consulting with bankruptcy lawyers and filing bankruptcy did not estab-
lish scienter because companies commonly consult bankruptcy counsel to
explore options before deciding to file for bankruptcy.188 Fourth, assess-
ments of the company’s liquidity by others did not establish scienter be-
cause such assessments do not indicate whether the officers’ assessments
were reasonably held.189 Finally, the petition’s failure to allege that the
officers profited from their misstatements undercut any inference of sci-
enter.190 With respect to the misstatements concerning the resignation of
the new chief executive officer, the Fifth Circuit found no scienter be-
cause the petition failed to allege that the new chief executive officer
communicated his reasons for resigning to the misstating officers.191
IV. CONCLUSION
As discussed previously, several courts have addressed the scope of the
TSA and TSFA. One Texas court of appeals refused to adopt the U.S.
Supreme Court’s “family resemblance” test for determining whether a
promissory note is a security. Instead, it continued to abide by the Fifth
Circuit’s investment/commercial distinction, nonetheless finding the note
to be a security because it paid 10% of the profits. The Fifth Circuit con-
sidered the interplay between state and federal exemptions for offerings
of less than $1 million under the SEC’s Rule 504, concluding that the
seller must rely on the exemptions provided in the states where the secur-
ities are sold rather than on the Texas exemption. The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas determined that the purchase of con-
vertible notes was not a transaction in stock under the TSFA.
The TSSB clarified its confidential status and broadened an exemption
by obtaining an Attorney General opinion that the TSSB’s confidential
investigative documents are not subject to disclosure under the Public
Information Act because such documents are rendered confidential by
statute and fit within the disclosure exemption contained in the Act. The
TSSB also amended its manual secondary trading exemption for sales by
registered dealers to include the otcmarkets.com and Mergent manuals.
The Texas Legislature added a new section to the TSA to provide pro-
tection for vulnerable adults—those over age sixty-five or disabled—by
requiring dealers’ agents and investment advisers’ representatives to
monitor their client records and report any suspected financial exploita-
tion of vulnerable adults to their dealers and investment advisers, who
are required to investigate and report to the TSSB within five days.
The TSSB’s enforcement efforts against dealers included an advance
fee scheme involving purported affiliation with the IRS; failure to report
compromises with creditors, imposition of tax liens, and felony arrests;
and failure to follow dealers’ written policies concerning client-signed
188. Id.
189. Id. at 752.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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blank forms. The enforcement efforts against investment advisors in-
volved failure to enforce written policies, failure to maintain custody of
client funds with the required safeguards, participation in client block
trades contrary to the investment adviser’s policy, failure to abide by
FINRA undertakings, and failure to report tax liens and civil judgments
against the representative.
Criminal enforcement efforts involved the sale of unregistered securi-
ties, high interest notes, and life settlements. One court of appeals dealing
with unregistered securities found the TSA’s criminal section constitu-
tional against the charge that a finding of materiality under the TSA re-
quired the application of the “reasonable investor” test used in civil cases.
The appellate court found that, because the statute required intentional
conduct, the mental-state requirement for criminal conduct was satisfied.
The appellate court then reversed the securities fraud conviction due to
the five-year statute of limitations.
Another court of appeals dealing with high-interest real estate notes
and a Ponzi scheme upheld a securities fraud conviction, finding that the
criminal mental state required under the TSA was sufficiently established
despite the claim that donation of fraudulently obtained funds for chari-
table purposes and lack of an educational background defeat an intent to
defraud. A court of appeals dealing with life settlements rejected a claim
in a habeas corpus proceeding that a criminal provision under the TSA
was unconstitutional due to vagueness and the retroactive application of
a judicial opinion. Although the decision after indictment held that the
life settlement was a security, the appellate court relied on a Texas case
holding that a life settlement was not a security, finding that the claim
dealt with a statute’s application rather than its form.
Regarding fraud actions under the TSA, one court of appeals reversed
a summary judgment in favor of investors in a start-up company in which
not all provisions were initially known. The company’s alleged misrepre-
sentations and omissions were cleared up by a company agreement
signed three years and seven months before the investors filed suit, so
there was a fact issue as to whether the statute of limitations was satisfied.
Another court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of a
company that purchased its investors’ shares in a cash-out merger. The
appellate court rejected the investors’ claims of alleged misrepresenta-
tions and omissions where the insolvent company was sold a year and a
half later for many times more than the cash-out price, finding that the
investors had failed to establish the materiality of the alleged misrepre-
sentations and omissions. Finally, in the federal sphere, the Fifth Circuit
held that investors in a company failed to establish a strong inference of
scienter on the part of the company’s officers where the officers were not
enriched by their misstatements, therefore rendering the investors inca-
pable of pleading a required motive for the alleged misrepresentations
and omissions.
